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Executive	  summary1	  	  	  
 
Resilience has in recent years become a new catchword in critical infrastructure 
debates. But what is exactly meant by resilience in this context; is it an alternative to 
protection, and if not, what is their relationship?  How can critical infrastructure 
resilience be enhanced, and how can we know how resilient critical infrastructure is in 
the first place? Can it be measured and tested? This paper, being a concise literature 
review and a conceptual treatment of the issue, provides some tentative answers to 
these questions focusing especially on the technological dimension of critical 
infrastructure.  
The paper starts with a short survey of the emergence of the resilience discourse 
in the context of critical infrastructure, focusing on unofficial policy and scientific 
analyses. This first section discusses in particular the different dimensions and 
meanings present in this rather complex discourse in order to provide some analytical 
structure to elaborate the issue further. It is concluded that one can differentiate 
between at least four sectoral dimensions of critical infrastructure resilience, namely 
societal, economic, organisational and technological resilience.  
The second section then looks at the issue of when, how and in which forms the 
resilience discourse has entered the official policy debates, especially comparing the 
US and EU developments. In general, one can conclude that the resilience debate is 
more mature and higher on the political agenda in the US, but recently the issue has 
become more central also in the European Union and its Member States. It is also 
argued in the paper that when comparing the US and EU approaches, the US approach 
towards critical infrastructure resilience is based on voluntary public-private 
partnerships, whereas the EU approach indicates a somewhat stronger emphasis on 
(national) regulation. In both cases, the focus has mostly been in organisational and 
community resilience measures, although some technological resilience issues have 
more recently been brought forward, particularly in the US. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  This paper has been written in the context of European Reference Network for Critical Infrastructure Protection (ERNCIP), 
a project at the Institute for the Protection and the Security of the Citizen of the Joint Research Centre (JRC) of the European 
Commission. The project was set up in 2009 under the mandate of the DG Home Affairs, and with the agreement of Member 
States. ERNCIP is especially focusing on issues related with technological security solutions and their testing. Due to this 
context, the paper’s focus is on technological dimensions of critical infrastructure resilience, and its arguments and 
conclusions are tailored to advise ERNCIP on how it could contribute in enhancing critical infrastructure resilience.	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The third section deals with the technological dimension of critical infrastructure 
resilience in some detail, and further analyses the concept by categories. The paper 
proposes four functional levels of technological resilience: resilient design, 
dependencies and interdependencies, redundancy and restoring capability.  
Finally, the main arguments are summarised and some practical conclusions are 
drawn. While the paper provides some tentative elements to operationalise the concept 
of resilience, it is concluded that the strategic goal should be to create a harmonised or 
standardised understanding of the issue in order critical infrastructure resilience to be 
better enhanced, evaluated, measured and tested. 
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1. The	  Emergence	  of	  the	  Resilience	  Discourse	  	  
 
The resilience discourse2 first started appearing in unofficial policy and scientific 
analyses3 in the mid-2000s in the context of crisis and disaster management. Soon, 
however, it also penetrated the field of critical infrastructure. This section outlines 
the main course of this development. It concludes that while the exact boundaries of 
the discourse are still rather obscure, certain sub-discourses, research fields and 
partially shared definitions have emerged and even become institutionalized. 
Consequently, we can differentiate between at least four different dimensions of critical 
infrastructure resilience: societal, economic, organisational, and technological. 
Resilience	  vs.	  protection	  	  	  
In the early debates on critical infrastructure resilience, there was often criticism of 
official government positions that were perceived to be overly protection-oriented, 
on the basis that complete critical infrastructure protection can never be guaranteed. 
Moreover, achieving the desired guaranteed level of protection is normally not cost-
effective in relation to the actual threats. A small increment in the level of 
protection might introduce a large amount of additional costs, and therefore 
alternative approaches need to be considered. Thus, as de Bruijne and van Eeven 
put it in 2007, a fringe benefit from a more resilience-based preparation approach is 
that these “measures are substantially less expensive than investments in specific 
infrastructure upgrades to avoid certain risk scenarios which may or may not 
occur.”	   Putting the same idea into more poetic language, in their 2007 article 
Landstedt and Holmström proposed that the characteristics of protection and 
resilience could be likened to the characteristics of a rigid stick and a flexible one. 
The former is harder to bend, but under severe pressure will snap and cannot be 
repaired. By contrast, the flexible stick is easy to bend, always regains its shape and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 We prefer to use the concept of ‘discourse’ – instead of ‘debate’, for example – to describe our subject matter, to 
emphasise that the concept of ‘resilience’ is socially constructed, open to conflicting interpretations, open to changes 
over time, and also to note that even a ‘discourse’, especially a dominant one within a certain context, exercises 
control or power that may have some practical, political and physical consequences. 
3 E.g. Regional Disaster Resilience: A Guide for Developing an Action Plan, The American Society of Civil 
Engineers/The Infrastructure Security Partnership (TISP), June 2006.To be sure, there can be found early 
examples already from the 1970s, where the concept of ‘resiliency’ were used especially in ecological studies 
and, rarely, in the context of disasters. See the short review in Adam Z. Rose, Economic Resilience to Disasters, 
CARRI Research Report 8, CREATE Research Archive, Published Articles & Papers, 11-1-2009, p. Chapter 2.  
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is hard to break. Therefore, they argue, focusing on protection alone may provide a 
false sense of security, which can turn out to be disastrous, as has been proven many 
times in history. For Landstedt and Holmström, resilience is a much wider concept 
than protection, encompassing not only protection itself, but also prevention, 
training, education, research, deterrence, risk-based mitigation, response, recovery 
and longer-term restoration.4   
Societal	  resilience	  
From early on, the context where the concept of resilience is used in safety and 
security–related debates refers to regional, community or societal resilience during 
and after the crisis, disaster, hazard or incident. For instance, Boin and McConnell 
in their 2007 analysis tell us that it is especially important to create societal 
resilience capacity, relying on joint efforts, training, continuity planning etc. of the 
whole society, including communities and businesses, rather than only enhancing 
the authorities’ crisis management capacities or control.5 The task therefore is to 
develop society’s survival and recovery strategies in these situations. This may refer 
to issues such as social vulnerability and degree of community preparedness, 
availability of shelter options for disaster victims, capacity to address human needs, 
time to restore lifeline services etc.6  
There exist many efforts to define community resilience in more detail. McAslan 
in his 2010 analysis7, for instance, differentiates between the enablers of community 
resilience. Physical enablers aim to satisfy the basic human needs, such as utilities 
(water, electricity, and gas), food, health services, transportation, communications and 
banking. Procedural enablers of community resilience provide the information and 
ideas needed to plan, prepare for, respond to, and recover from a major disruptive 
event. Finally, social enablers of community resilience are the community cohesion 
and motivation to withstand the emergencies.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Jyrki Landstedt and Petter Holmström, Electric Power Systems Blackouts and the Rescue Services: the Case 
of Finland, CIVPRO Working Paper 2007:1. 
5  Arjen Boin and Aalan McConnell, Preparing for critical Infrastructure Breakdowns: The Limits of Crisis 
Management and the Need of Resilience’, Contingencies and Crisis Management, Volume 15 Number 1, 
March 2007, pp. 50-59. 
6 T.D. O’Rourke, ‘Critical Infrastructure, Interdependencies, and Resilience,’ The Bridge, volume37, number1, 
Spring 2007. To be found at: 
http://www.nae.edu/Publications/Bridge/EngineeringfortheThreatofNaturalDisasters/CriticalInfrastructureInterdepen
denciesandResilience.aspx.  
7 Alastair McAslan, Community Resilience. Understanding the Concept and its Applications, 2010, to be found at: 
http://sustainablecommunitiessa.files.wordpress.com/2011/06/community-resilience-from-torrens-institute.pdf  
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However, there are also those who argue that the fact that there is no universally 
agreed definition of community resilience may be a good thing. Defining community 
resilience would be against the very meaning of the concept as a community should be 
an autonomous, self-organising, self-defining entity. Therefore ‘resilience’ should be 
understood as a relative term “that can look wildly different in different contexts and 
according to different developmental stages of community life.”  Likewise, the concept 
of ‘community’ is “a contested idea that makes different kinds of sense according to the 
values, location and perspective of the reader.”8  
Consequently, while good practices of resilient communities exist, there are no 
agreed methodologies or metrics on how to test community resilience. In any case, 
from the critical infrastructure point of view, the concept is not very helpful. Even if 
critical infrastructure is involved, the focus would be on the local community’s 
problems, not on the wider problems potentially caused by a failure of critical 
infrastructure.  
Economic	  resilience	  
Another field of study also emerged around the same time, in the early 2000s, 
focusing on economic resilience. Obviously the issue here is, broadly speaking, to 
study the economic consequences of either the existence or absence of resiliency, 
with an aim to propose and encourage resilience measures. A review of the 
literature on economics indicates that most in-depth studies of economic resilience 
emerged first in the area of ecological economics, with resilience sometimes 
characterized in a typical Darwinian sense: systems, like species, that cannot adapt 
are unlikely to survive. This literature especially emphasised the need to take into 
account the lack of predictability and the disequilibrium nature of dynamics, as well 
as the chaos theory axiom that even small changes can be magnified to system 
failures. When put into more economic terms, the main focus in this literature is on 
the dynamics of technological innovation and the need of adaptive behaviour of 
businesses and markets.9 Consequently, issues such as the extent of regional 
economic diversification; the ability to substitute and conserve necessary inputs; 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Nick Wilding, Exploring Community Resilience in Times of Rapid Change, Carnegie UK Trust. August 2011, to 
be found at: 
http://www.carnegieuktrust.org.uk/carnegie/media/sitemedia/Publications/ExploringCommunityResiliencedownload.
pdf  
9 Rose, op. cit., pp. 7-8. 
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business and industry capacity to improvise; and the time needed to regain capacity 
or lost revenues; are often emphasised in this field of study. 10 
Recently, this field of study has been focusing on developing resilience indicators 
or an overall resilient index to characterize economic resilience. Economy being a more 
exact discipline than most other social sciences, this task demands a more clear-cut or 
rigid definition for resilience. Thus Rose defines economic resilience by differentiating 
between two types of resilience: static economic resilience is “the ability of an entity or 
system to maintain function (e.g., continue producing) when shocked” whereas 
dynamic economic resilience “is the speed at which an entity or system recovers from a 
severe shock to achieve a desired state.”11 Rose and Krausman have further divided the 
‘economic’ into three levels: microeconomic (individual business or household); 
mesoeconomic (individual industry or market); and macroeconomic (combination of all 
economic entities). As they note, the latter overlaps considerably with the community 
or societal resilience focus.12  
Organisational	  resilience	  	  
Economic resilience, at least in some dimensions as previously described, already went 
beyond the general societal resilience discourse and touched entities such as critical 
infrastructure sectors, approaching them from the viewpoint of the enterprise. A further 
step in this direction is provided by putting the focus on organisational resilience (also 
sometimes called operational resilience). 
Often, organisational resilience is a concept applied to the crisis management and 
civil protection systems. Issues such as emergency operations planning, alternate sites 
for managing disaster operations, capacity to improvise, innovate and expand 
operations, as well as the time between impact and early recovery are those that are 
sometimes emphasised as the key elements of a resilient organisational strategy in this 
discourse.13 One basic way to enhance organisational resilience is through training and 
preparedness. For instance, in the case of electricity supply disruptions, this might 
mean operators having readymade plans of how and when personnel should be called 
in, or put on stand-by, keeping maps up to date, maintaining information about how 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 T.D. O’Rourke, op. cit.  
11 Rose, op. cit., p. 8. 
12 Adam Rose and Elisabeth Krausman, ‘An Economic Framework for the Development of a Resilience Index for 
Business Recovery,’ International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction 5(2013), pp.73–83. 
13 O’Rourke, op. cit. 
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disruption could affect operations, monitoring weather forecasts, making arrangements 
with third parties for providing spare parts and additional equipment, preparing for 
cooperation with the emergency services, finding out vulnerabilities in 
telecommunication nodes, waterworks and sewage farms, or prioritising support for 
vulnerable groups such as hospitals, nursing homes for older people, schools, day-care 
centres etc.14  
Organisational resilience also connects the resilience concept to the concept of 
business continuity, as is revealed by the title of one of the cornerstones of this 
discourse, namely Sheffi’s 2005 monograph The Resilient Enterprise15. Keeping the 
business going is normally the key driver for infrastructure operators, as complete 
failure of the infrastructure to deliver service could quickly lead to financial disaster for 
the operator, regardless of the impact on society. From this perspective, it is proposed 
by McAslan that “organisational resilience does not replace risk management and 
continuity planning; resilience should be seen as an organisational goal, whereas risk 
management and continuity planning are management tools.”16 
In more general terms, this literature is very much focused on the challenges of the 
supply chain in the context of potential infrastructure failures17, and in fact the first 
resilience standards are related to this issue. Thus, the ISO 28002 standard for 
resilience in the supply chain18 was approved in 2011, based on the United States 
ANSI/ASIS19 organisational resilience standard.20  The ISO standard is said to specify 
the following:  
 
“[…] requirements for a resilience management system to enable an organization 
to develop and implement policies, objectives, and programs taking into account 
legal requirements and other requirements to which the organization subscribes, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Landstedt and Holmström, op. cit. 
15 Y. Sheffi, Y. The Resilient Enterprise - Overcoming Vulnerability for Competitive Advantage’, Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press, 2005. 
16 Alastair McAslan, Organisational Resilience. Understanding the Concept and its Application. 3 May 2010. To be 
found at: 
http://www.google.it/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=3&ved=0CDoQFjAC&url=http%3A%2F%2Fw
ww.executiveaccelerators.com.au%2FLiteratureRetrieve.aspx%3FID%3D129836&ei=zSbVUv66GIinyQOGn4GIC
g&usg=AFQjCNHvoywQ-bRpx-9FZRc5yw6t7oQh5w&bvm=bv.59378465,d.bGQ  
17 For different approaches, see Enrico Briano, Claudia Caballini, and Roberto Revetria, Literature review about 
supply chain vulnerability and resiliency,  Proceedings of the 8th WSEAS International Conference on SYSTEM 
SCIENCE and SIMULATION in ENGINEERING, 2009. 
18 ISO 28002:2011. Security management systems for the supply chain – Development of resilience in the supply chain. 
To be found at: http://www.iso.org/iso/catalogue_detail?csnumber=56087. See also 
http://www.securityinfowatch.com/press_release/10481337/standard-for-resilience-in-supply-chain-approved-by-iso  
19 ANSI refers to American National Standards Institute. ASIS exists only as an abbreviation. 
20 See https://www.asisonline.org/Standards-Guidelines/Standards/Pages/Resilience-Standards.aspx.  
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information about significant risks, hazards and threats that may have an impact on 
it (and its stakeholders’), and protection of critical assets (human, physical, 
intangible, and environmental.”21  
 
As this definition of the scope of the particular standard reveals, in the organisational 
resilience discourse it is a question about a proper risk management system embedded 
in the organization rather than technological solutions, and it includes such elements as 
training, risk assessment, prevention, mitigation etc. While this standard, for instance, 
gives some guidelines of testing, it does so only in order to test the organisational 
capacity, not the technological functionality or resilience of the system.  
Technological	  resilience	  
All of the above resilience dimensions or approaches, while important ones from a 
holistic crisis management and civil protection perspective, are more focussed on 
the macro level, requiring the intervention of many stakeholders. A more practical 
perspective for enhancing critical infrastructure resilience is provided by taking an 
engineering approach, or more broadly, a technological resilience approach, which 
has emerged to focus on this dimension of resilience.  
While the concept seems to be evolving and changing, depending especially on 
the type of infrastructure we look at, already some early resilience definitions were 
such that this dimension could be included. Thus, according to a 2007 definition, “a 
resilient infrastructure is a component, system or facility that is able to withstand 
damage or disruption, but if affected, can be readily and cost-effectively restored.”22 
In other words, according to this definition, there are two key concepts in resilience 
that should be demanded from a resilient critical infrastructure, namely resistance 
and restoration capability. The notion is important, because these elements of 
resilience provide us with much more concrete understanding about what we are 
talking about or what we could measure when we talk about resilient infrastructure.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 International Standardization Organization.  See ISO 28002:2011 ‘Security management systems for the supply chain 
- Development of resilience in the supply chain - Requirements with guidance for use’, to be found at 
http://www.iso.org/iso/home/store/catalogue_tc/catalogue_detail.htm?csnumber=56087.   Also ISO/NP 22316 on 
‘Societal security - Organizational resilience - Principles and guidelines’ is under development. 
 
22 ‘Critical Thinking: Moving from Infrastructure Protection to Infrastructure Resilience,’ CIIP Resilience Series 
Monograph. CIP Program Discussion Paper series. Virginia: George Mason University. No page numbers. 
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In fact, Bruneau et al. had already in 200323 provided a typology of the 
resilience aspects of an earthquake that could be applied to technological resilience 
as well. This typology included four levels: robustness, redundancy, 
resourcefulness, and rapidity (of recovery). Basically the same elements are 
included in the politically influential definition of Flynn from 2008,24 which includes 
four factors: robustness, which is the ability to keep a critical infrastructure operating or 
stay standing in the face of disaster; resourcefulness, which means a skilful 
management of a disaster once it unfolds; rapid recovery, the capacity to get things 
back to normal as quickly as possible after a disaster; and, finally, learning, that is, the 
ability to absorb new lessons that can be drawn from a catastrophe. 
So far our discussion has shown that there are several possible dimensions of 
critical infrastructure resilience – societal resilience, economic resilience, 
organisational resilience, and technological resilience25   – all of which entail a 
somewhat rival approach to the subject. From the point of view of this paper, which has 
drawn heavily from the understanding of the technological dimensions of critical 
infrastructure protection derived from the work of the ERNCIP project, the most 
relevant dimension to focus on would be that of technological resilience. We will 
therefore cover technological resilience in more detail in the third section of this paper.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Bruneau, M., S. Chang, R. Eguchi, G. Lee, T. O’Rourke, A. Reinhorn, M. Shinozuka, K. Tierney, W. Wallace, and 
D. von Winterfeldt. ‘A Framework to Quantitatively Assess and Enhance Seismic Resilience of Communities,’ 
Earthquake Spectra 2003 19: 733–52. 
24 Stephen E. Flynn, ‘America the Resilient: Defying Terrorism and Mitigating Natural Disasters.’ Foreign Affairs, 
vol. 83, no. 2, (March/April), 2008, to be found at:  http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20080301faessay87201-p0/stephen-
e-flynn/america-the-resilient.html  
25 In fact, in the literature, one can find even more categories, which could be treated as separate dimensions or sublevels 
of those focused on her, such as ecological resilience or planning resilience. Thus Francis and Bekera include “critical 
infrastructure resilience; organizational resilience; socio-ecological resilience and coupled ecological-engineered 
systems; and economic resilience.” They furthermore conclude that the many definitions of resilience prevent (and thus 
undermine)”a universal understanding of resilience.” See the review article Royce Francis and Behailu Bekera, ‘A metric 
and frameworks for resilience analysis of engineered and infrastructure systems,’ Reliability Engineering and System 
Safety 121 (2014), pp. 90-103, here  p. 92, Table 1 pp.94, 95, Appendix A, pp. 100-102, to be found at http://ac.els-
cdn.com/S0951832013002147/1-s2.0-S0951832013002147-main.pdf?_tid=7b5aa126-7deb-11e3-96a3-
00000aab0f02&acdnat=1389793789_8bee6245b9a88e7c78da649d5c5f500b. Others have added to the above ones such 
concepts as ‘functional resilience’, personal resilience’ and ‘physical resilience’, see Wayne Boone, ‘ Functional 
Resilience: The ‘Business End’ of Organizational Resilience,’ The CIP Report, Center for Infrastructure Protection and 
Homeland Security. Volume 12 Number 7, January 2014, pp. 5-8.  For ‘personal resilience’, see Ronald Bearse. ‘The 
Return on Investing in Personal resilience’, ’The CIP Report, Center for Infrastructure Protection and Homeland 
Security. Volume 12 Number 7, January 2014, pp. 21-24. 
 
 12	  
	  
2. Resilience	  Enters	  Policy	  
 
Let us turn to the emergence of the concept of resilience in official policy relating to 
critical infrastructure. Tracing the development of this from the early 2000s is 
necessary in order to make sense that by 2014, all official policy documents on 
critical infrastructures have suddenly added resilience, alongside protection, into 
their agenda and, in many cases, into their title. How did this development take 
place, how is ‘resilience’ constructed in these policy documents, and what practical 
impact does this concept imply for the future?   
The concept of resilience emerged first in the US policy documents, and only 
much later can this discourse be found in EU policy documents. While the EU 
appears to have copied the US approach, it can also be shown that there was some 
‘indigenous’ pressure from the Member States to take the resilience discourse on-
board, especially from those countries who relied on more cross-sectoral approaches 
to CIP, emphasising the importance of vital societal functions rather than the focus 
on only sectoral critical infrastructure protection. Comparing the US and EU 
approaches, one can also argue – though with some hesitation – that while the US 
approach towards critical infrastructure resilience is based on voluntary public-
private partnerships, the EU approach indicates a somewhat stronger emphasis on 
(national) regulation. In both cases, the focus has mostly been in organisational and 
community resilience measures, although some technological resilience issues 
(resilient design of critical infrastructure etc.) have more recently been brought 
forward, particularly in the US.  
Resilience	  in	  the	  US	  	  	  
As is well known, the concept of critical infrastructure can be traced back to the US 
in the mid-1990s, when some infrastructures began to be seen as critical for the 
functioning of the society and at the same time vulnerable to security-related threats 
(rather than safety or natural hazards). Soon, policy documents were introduced, 
where critical infrastructure protection became the key concept.26 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 See Christer Pursiainen, ‘The Challenges for European Critical Infrastructure Protection’, Journal of European 
Integration, Issue 31/6, November 2009. 
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As already mentioned, the resilience discourse in the context of critical 
infrastructure had first been introduced in unofficial policy analyses and, in some cases, 
in scientific analyses. By the later part of the 2000s, the concept penetrated into critical 
infrastructure –related policy documents, first and most notably in the US. Moteff, who 
has analysed this development (in his 2012 report to the Congress), informs us that 
already in 2006, following Hurricane Katrina, the Critical Infrastructure Task Force of 
the Homeland Security Advisory Council initiated a public policy debate, arguing that 
the government’s critical infrastructure policies were focused too much on protecting 
assets from terrorist attacks and not focused enough on improving the resilience of 
assets against a variety of threats. This approach gained support in policy circles, and 
consequently in 2008 the House Committee on Homeland Security held a series of 
hearings addressing resilience. After this, resilience started to make appearance in the 
policy documents, first rather superficially or as part of the protective policies, but after 
a while equally considered alongside with protective measures.27  
A key role was probably played here by the National Infrastructure Advisory 
Council, the critical infrastructure operators’ and owners’ lobby, and especially its 2008 
report28, focusing on public-private partnership, and even more its 2009 report29, which 
was already focusing solely on resilience and entitled Critical Infrastructure Resilience. 
The former report sees the public-private partnership as the most efficient way to 
enhance critical infrastructure security – instead of increasing regulation! – based on 
the idea that where “market forces are free to operate, they will be the most efficient 
and efficacious vehicle to enhance the security posture of critical infrastructures.” In 
this scheme, then, “protection and resilience must be complementary elements of an 
integrated risk management strategy.” The latter report then develops the issue further, 
and in its recommendations it asks the government to use a White House level authority 
to adopt a common definition for resilience and disseminate a high level, top-down 
strategy for the development and funding of resilience efforts. It also calls for an 
increased coordination among all levels of government and critical infrastructure 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 John D. Moteff, Critical Infrastructure Resilience: The Evolution of Policy and Programs and Issues for Congress, 
August 23, 2012, Congressional Research Service 7-5700. To be found at 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R42683.pdf.  
28 National Infrastructure Advisory Council, Critical Infrastructure Partnership Strategic Assessment Final Report and 
Recommendations. October 14, 2008. To be found at 
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/niac/niac_critical_infrastructure_protection_assessment_final_report.pdf.  
29 National Infrastructure Advisory Council. Critical Infrastructure Resilience. Final Report and Recommendations, 
September 8, 2009. To be found at: http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/niac/niac_critical_infrastructure_resilience.pdf. 
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owners and operators, clarifying roles and responsibilities of critical infrastructure 
partners, strengthening and leveraging public-private partnership, encouraging 
resilience using appropriate market incentives, as well as implementing government 
enabling activities and programs in concert with critical infrastructure owners and 
operators. 
Looking at the US government documents following these unofficial policy 
reports, it seems that the lobbyists’ approach is at least partially reflected in them. 
Already the 2009 update of the National Infrastructure Protection Plan was further 
renamed Partnering to enhance protection and resiliency, and it emphases public-
private partnership and resilience, although the very term resilience is still used rather 
superficially without much concrete content. After that, during the new Obama 
administration, resilience has however become a constant part of similar government 
documents that touch critical infrastructure. A new development started, especially 
after Fukushima (2011) and Hurricane Sandy (October 2012), which stimulated several 
new policy documents that were based on resilience rather than protection.30 Thus the 
[US] Presidential Policy Directive on Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience 
from February 2013 defines resilience as follows, following closely the definitions 
presented above in the previous section:  
 
“The term ‘resilience’ means the ability to prepare for and adapt to changing 
conditions and withstand and recover rapidly from disruptions. Resilience includes 
the ability to withstand and recover from deliberate attacks, accidents, or naturally 
occurring threats or incidents.”31 
 
Moteff in his previously mentioned analysis concludes that the US policy had by 2012 
evolved “to the point that resilience and protection of critical infrastructure assets are 
recognized as distinct options to be equally considered when seeking to reduce the risks 
associated with potential attacks on critical infrastructures.” Consequently, today 
resilience figures in the US well not only in policy documents, but it has received its 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Hurricane Sandy Rebuilding Strategy. Stronger Communities, A Resilient Region. Presented to the President of the 
United States August 2013. To be found at: http://www.districtenergy.org/blog/2013/08/23/6187/  
31 The Presidential Policy Directive (PPD-21) on Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience advances a national 
unity of effort to strengthen and maintain secure, functioning, and resilient critical infrastructure. To be found at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/02/12/presidential-policy-directive-critical-infrastructure-security-
and-resil 
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share also in targeted funding, including in Research & Development32 and a specific 
‘Regional Resilience Assessment Program’33.  
The Presidential Policy Directive stimulated the new version of National 
Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP 2013), which has a subtitle Partnership for 
Critical Infrastructure Strategy and Resilience.34 The nature of this rather long 
document is in the form of a crisis management check list, discussing all types of 
possible critical infrastructure disaster scenarios, from prevention to recovery phases. 
Mostly its focus is on organisational and management issues, but it also mentions such 
issues as resilient design of critical technologies, and demands that whenever an 
incident takes place, one should "repair or replace damaged infrastructure with cost-
effective designs that are more secure and resilient.”35 In any case, it has been 
concluded that the two above mentioned recent US. Policy documents recognise CIP 
“as an enabler of CIR” (critical infrastructure resilience).36  
While the US approach currently recognizes resilience alongside protection, or 
perhaps even emphasises the former at the cost of the latter (e.g. NIPP 2013), it is 
noteworthy that this approach is based on public-private partnership in the spirit of 
voluntary measures from the private side. This approach has created some suspicions 
that the operators and owners of critical infrastructure pay only lip-service to resilience 
when it suits them, but when “critical infrastructure operators participate in a public-
private resilience partnership, individual operators tend to invest as little as possible 
into the partnership.”37 
Resilience	  in	  the	  EU	  	  
After 9/11 the concept of critical infrastructure protection became more widely 
prevalent in Europe, first in NATO, and soon thereafter also within the EU. After 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Moteff, op. cit. 
33 John F. Mortin, GAO Report Calls for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to Strengthen the Management of 
its Regional Resiliency Assessment Program, ’The CIP Report, Center for Infrastructure Protection and Homeland 
Security. Volume 12 Number 7, January 2014, pp. 13-16. 
34 National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP 2013). Partnering for Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience. 
Homeland Security; to be found at 
http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/NIPP%202013_Partnering%20for%20Critical%20Infrastructure
%20Security%20and%20Resilience_508.pdf  
35 NIPP 2013, op. cit., p. 19. 
36	  Jeff Gaynor, ‘Quantifying and Implementing Critical Infrastructure Resilience (CIR): Building and 
Sustaining a Certifiable Resilient America,’The CIP Report, Center for Infrastructure Protection and Homeland 
Security. Volume 12 Number 7, January 2014, pp. 9-12, here p. 10.  	  
37 ‘Market pressures weigh against private sector critical infrastructure resilience’, FierceHomelandSecurity. To be 
found at http://www.fiercehomelandsecurity.com/story/market-pressures-weigh-against-private-sector-critical-
infrastructure-resil/2013-04-04  
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the 2004 Madrid and 2005 London terrorist attacks, the EU debate culminated in the 
development of the European Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection 
(EPCIP) and its corresponding legislation in 2008.38 At that time the concept of 
resilience did not appear in policy documents. While the ‘Green Paper’39, which 
launched the EPCIP, recognizes that not all infrastructures can be protected from all 
threats, its solution is to prioritize the protective measures and protected objects 
instead of increasing resilience. Similarly, the Council Directive on CIP40 is marked 
by the same approach, and, consequently, by the absence of reference to resilience. 
However, as was the case with the concept of critical infrastructure protection, 
the EU followed the US with some years delay in adopting the resilience discourse 
in the context of critical infrastructure and EPCIP, in the wake of extensive floods 
in Europe and other effects of severe weather. In the 2012 Commission Staff Working 
Document on the Review of the EPCIP (of the DG Home), the concept of resilience 
plays already a rather prominent role. Resilience is here seen as a cross-sectoral 
approach, whereas the original EPCIP was, it is said in the document, based on a 
sectoral approach. The document thus exercises some self-criticism and reveals also 
one reason why some Member States’ expectations and practices were not 
completely met in the EPCIP Directive.  
 
“A number of Member States follow system-focused national CIP programmes 
where the end goal is security and resilience of systems, which may involve 
activities across multiple sectors. As a result, the sector-focused approach 
presented a major challenge. Some of these Member States have adopted a 
‘service’-oriented approach for analysis. For instance they identify vital services 
from a national perspective, such as energy supply, and then implement processes 
and procedures to increase the security and resilience of such services. Hence, they 
are focused on final outcomes and are not restricted by the sectoral boundaries of 
the Directive. As regards the issue of energy supply, this would for instance 
involve the energy, transport, and ICT sectors.”41 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Pursiainen, op. cit. 
39 Commission of The European Communities, Green Paper on a European Programme for Critical Infrastructure 
Protection, Brussels, 17.11.2005 Com(2005) 576 Final. To be found at: http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2005/com2005_0576en01.pdf. 
40 Council Directive 2008/114/EC of 8 December 2008 on the identification and designation of European critical 
infrastructures and the assessment of the need to improve their protection. To be found at: http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2008:345:0075:0082:EN:PDF. 
41 Commission Staff Working Document on the Review of the European Programme for Critical Infrastructure 
Protection  (EPCIP), Brussels, 22.6.2012, SWD(2012) 190 final, here p. 8. To be found at 
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/pdf/policies/crisis_and_terrorism/epcip_swd_2012_190_final.pdf .  
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The DG Home staff working document makes no explicit references to US policies, but 
it makes a reference to two other EU documents in the context of the new found 
emphasis on resilience. The first one is the Stockholm Programme — An Open and 
Secure Europe Serving and Protecting Citizens adopted by the European Council in 
2009. This rather general-level security and safety policy programme discusses critical 
infrastructure resilience only at one instance, where the context is cyber security –
related threats:  
 
“The European Council invites the Council, the Commission, the European 
Parliament, where appropriate, and the Member States to: draw up and implement 
policies to ensure a high level of network and information security throughout the 
Union and improve measures aimed at protection, security preparedness and 
resilience of critical infrastructure, including Information and Communication 
Technology (ICT) and services infrastructure.” 42 
 
The other document referred to in the DG Home staff working document is the EU 
Internal Security Strategy, in particular its objective 5: “Increase Europe's resilience to 
crises and disasters”. Resilience in this Commission Communication is however 
presented vaguely, referring to (again) “cross-sectoral threats” that “call for 
improvements to long-standing crisis and disaster management practices in terms of 
efficiency and coherence.” 43  
The Staff Working Document of the Commission from 201344 already includes 
several references to the concept of resilience and it indeed uses the phrase “CI 
protection and resilience” frequently. Usually these two concepts are presented 
together, but the document does not explicitly define either of the concepts nor does it 
make it clear how they differ from each other and how they are related. In one 
occasion, however, when discussing the four “relevant pan-European critical 
infrastructures” that are to be used as European pilot projects from 2013 onwards (i.e. 
Eurocontrol; Galileo; The European Electricity Transmission Grid; The European Gas 
Transmission Network), it is mentioned that the respective work streams “seek to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 European Council. The Stockholm Programme – An Open and Secure Europe Serving and Protecting Citizen. 
Adopted by the Conclusions of the European Council of 10/11 December 2009.  
43 European Commission. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council. The EU 
Internal Security Strategy in Action: Five steps towards a more secure Europe, Brussels, 22.11.2010 COM(2010) 673 
final. To be found at:  
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2010:0673:FIN:EN:PDF#page=2.  
44 Commission Staff Working Document on a new approach to the European Programme for Critical Infrastructure 
Protection Making European Critical Infrastructures more secure Brussels, 28.8.2013. SWD(2013) 318 final. 
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provide useful tools for improving protection and resilience, including through 
providing for strengthened risk mitigation, preparedness and response measures”.45 
In fact, earlier more rigid definitions and more detailed treatments can be found 
from the official policy documents in some of the Member States. For instance, the UK 
defines resilience much in the same language that was presented in the previous section 
when reviewing more analytic literature, that is, as a combination of four ‘components’: 
resistance; reliability; redundancy; response and recovery.46 
Sectorally, resilience of critical infrastructure has been discussed in the EU in 
somewhat more detail in a few policy documents, but also here a more profound 
treatment can be found at the national Member States level (e.g. UK47). However, it is 
not surprising that within the EU context, resilience has most notably found its way into 
the cyber security field. The EU Cybersecurity Strategy48 from 2013 discusses this 
issue under the subtitle “Achieving cyber resilience”, and the strategy notes rather 
optimistically that “Member States should have, either already today or as a result of 
this strategy, structures to deal with cyber resilience.” Basically this document suggests 
that resilience is promoted when both the authorities and private sector have more 
capabilities, capacities, resources and processes to prevent, detect and handle cyber 
security incidents. In doing so, the Cybersecurity Strategy notes, voluntary cooperation 
is needed but also new legislation, establishing common minimum requirements at 
national level.  
Thus, compared with the US, the EU approach, though referring to national rather 
than EU legislation, seems to be a step forward towards regulative efforts instead of 
mere voluntary compliance, although both the US and the EU make emphasis on the 
importance of public-private partnership. The EU Cyberstrategy goes further however 
by stating that one function of new (national) legislation would be to overcome the fact 
that private actors still lack effective incentives to provide reliable data on the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 Ibid, p. 10, italics added.	  
46 Section A: Introduction, Definitions and Principles of Infrastructure Resilience, UK Cabinet Office, to be found at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/78902/section-a-natural-hazards-
infrastructure.pdf 
47 Cabinet Office: A Summary of the: Sector Resilience Plans for Critical Infrastructure 2010 / 2011, May 2011, to be 
found at: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/62311/sector-resilience-plan-
2011.pdf. The UK National Infrastructure is categorised into nine sectors: Water, Energy, Transport, Communications, 
Health, Emergency Services, Finance, Food and Government. Some sectors are further divided into sub-sectors. 
48 Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and 
the Committee of the Regions. Cybersecurity Strategy of the European Union: An Open, Safe and Secure Cyberspace,  
Brussels, 7.2.2013, JOIN(2013) 1 final, p. 12, to be found at:  http://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/en/news/eu-
cybersecurity-plan-protect-open-internet-and-online-freedom-and-opportunity-cyber-security. 
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existence or impact of incidents, to embrace a risk management culture or to invest in 
security solutions. This is, it is said, especially important in a number of key areas: 
energy, transport, banking, stock exchanges, and enablers of key internet services, as 
well as public administrations.  
 
3. How	  to	  enhance,	  measure	  and	  test	  technological	  
resilience?	  
 
As has become clear above, critical infrastructure resilience is a multifaceted and in 
many ways a rather vague concept. While several competing definitions and alternative 
dimensions were presented in the previous sections, it appears however that when the 
concept is slowly becoming popularised both in policy and scientific analyses as well 
as in policy documents, a kind of a shared core definition is emerging; consequently, 
some key elements, though in different forms, are usually included in all definitions. 
Although the issue of metrics of resilience is still clearly underdeveloped49, the method 
of dividing the concept of resilience into the previously discussed less abstract parts 
makes it possible to display at least some more concrete and even testable 
characteristics of resilience. From a technological point of view, the most interesting 
elements that are usually highlighted in the resilience debates, and which could provide 
a basis for further elaboration, are resilient design, dependencies and 
interdependencies, redundancy, and restoring capability. This section will briefly 
introduce these concepts and illustrate some of the applications that can be found in the 
literature.  
Resilient	  design	  
‘Resilient design’, ‘resilient engineering’, ‘reliability’, ‘robustness’, or ‘absorptive 
capacity’ are largely overlapping terms which can be understood to cover the basic 
idea, that the safety and security factors should be built-in to the systems so that the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49	  However, one should mention that in the US there already exists a system called Resilience Measurement Index (RMI), 
based on an Infrastructure Survey Tool (IST), and operationalized in software called RMI Dashboard. While this tool is 
supposed to take into account of all resilience dimensions, it is characterised as a bottom-up approach. Frederic Petit, Kelly 
Wallace, and Julia Phillips, ‘An Approach to Critical Infrastructure Resilience,’’The CIP Report, Center for Infrastructure 
Protection and Homeland Security. Volume 12 Number 7, January 2014, pp.17-20. It is said that this system has been in use 
since January 2013 and more than 1,000 sites have been assessed with these tools. 	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systems would then be better capable of absorbing or withstanding disturbances, 
thereby minimising the consequences.  
Indeed, there are some concentrated policy efforts towards more resilient design of 
vulnerable or critical infrastructure and related technological systems. An example 
towards this end might be the US President Executive Order on Improving 
Cybersecurity from February 2013,50 which, among other things, orders the National 
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) to lead the development of a framework 
to reduce cyber risks to critical infrastructure. NIST has later referred to this task as 
‘build it right’ security guidelines, leading to security solutions that are resilient by 
design. However, it is worth pointing out that this approach still leaves a lot of room for 
interpretation as, in the language of the Executive Order, the new framework shall only 
“incorporate voluntary consensus standards and industry best practices to the fullest 
extent possible.” 
Reviewing the literature, we see that resilient design is today a well-used concept 
in areas such as city planning or spatial development, coming close to, and drawing on, 
the older concept of sustainability. Therefore, it is relatively easy to find practical 
examples and more or less clear criteria for how to build resilient societies at large. In 
critical infrastructure, however, the concept is relatively new and practical applications 
are still few. To be sure, there exists research in different fields, which tries to 
operationalise the term somewhat further also in the field of critical infrastructure. 
Rieger et al., for example, in their 2009 article focus on industrial control systems and 
define resilience in this context as follows:  
 
“A resilient control system is one that maintains state awareness and an accepted 
level of operational normalcy in response to disturbances, including threats of an 
unexpected and malicious nature.”51 
 
Rieger et al. explicitly call for a ‘paradigm shift’, which would mean a move from 
reactive to proactive control of plants and mechanisms by which the evaluation and 
verification of designs is considered all the way from design through implementation of 
resilient control systems. It is not, however, only a question of implementing resilient 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 Executive Order on Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity. See http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2013/02/12/executive-order-improving-critical-infrastructure-cybersecurity-0.  
51 Craig G. Rieger, David I. Gertman, Miles. A. McQueen, Resilient Control Systems: Next Generation Design 
Research, HSI 2009 Catania, Italy, May 21-23, 2009. To be found at 
http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&arnumber=5091051. 
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design principles to new infrastructures, but also to make the existing infrastructure 
more resilient by re-design.  These types of activities usually take place as a 
consequence of a learning process after emergencies. Thus when Hurricane Sandy in 
October 2012 hit New York and closed LaGuardia Airport for three days, several 
resilience projects were launched afterwards. Among them was one project aiming at 
making the electricity supply more resilient: 
 
“Rehabilitation of the airport’s monitoring and control system for LGA power 
distribution grid to enable the airport to more quickly monitor and address issues 
with its electrical distribution system. During Sandy, elements of the airport 
electrical system were shut down to prevent permanent damage as rising 
floodwaters submerged critical electrical infrastructure. Elements of the airports 
electrical system needed to be restarted and operated manually once floodwaters 
receded. This project will help the airport better withstand extreme weather events 
and reduce recovery time following severe situations through automated and 
remote monitoring and control systems.”52 
 
Yet how resilient systems exactly should be designed and how they should be tested 
has remained an undeveloped field (though, without doubt, the existing security 
solutions to critical infrastructure differ in terms of their resilience or robustness, which 
could be used as a starting point to find best practices53).  One way forward to clarify 
the situation would be to develop performance standards (and related testing 
methodologies) that would be more explicit about the requirements for a resilient 
design. The most important rule of resilient design perhaps is that an important function 
should not be dependent on a single element, or that one should not ‘put all eggs in one 
basket’. Already a rather early treatment of the issue of resilient system design by 
Fiksel from 2003 notes that:  
 
“Complex, hierarchically organized systems (e.g., aircraft, nuclear plants) tend to 
have rigid operating parameters, are resistant to stress only within narrow 
boundaries, and may be vulnerable to small, unforeseen perturbations. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 Governor Cuomo Announces Five Storm Mitigation and Resiliency Projects for LaGuardia Airport, Press release, to 
be found at: http://www.longisland.com/news/11-17-13/governor-cuomo-announces-five-storm-mitigation-and-
resiliency-projects-for-laguardia-airport.html  
53 For instance, there are automatic damage mitigation and response systems, which, say, in the event of an earthquake,  
turn off functions that could be dangerous, turn on emergency lighting and exit signs, create loud audible warnings, 
turn on sprinkler systems, unlock emergency storages and equipment cabinets, start automated control of elevators and 
air-conditioning systems and so on.   
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Alternatively, distributed systems composed of independent yet interactive 
elements may deliver equivalent or better functionality with greater resilience.”54 
 
However, the existing literature rarely goes very far to explain how this should be done 
in practice. Moreover, in practice such issues as dependencies and often unexpected 
interdependences make the picture much more complex. It is difficult to imagine the 
interdependencies and then design accordingly a system that would withstand these 
effects. Some theoretical treatments of this topic seem to emphasize that failure data 
from real-life cases are especially important for examining the resilience of systems and 
using these results in developing strategies to improve design.55  
For testing, this approach implies a methodology that applies previous failure 
parameters to technological security solutions in order to see whether the solution under 
test is resilient within these parameters. 
Avoiding	  harmful	  dependencies	  and	  interdependencies	  
A resilient critical infrastructure should not be such that, even if it would be robust 
itself, it would become easily dysfunctional due to dependencies or interdependencies 
between it and other related infrastructures or systems. A dependency in this context is 
understood as a unidirectional relationship from one infrastructure to another. Thus, the 
state of one infrastructure influences or is correlated to the state of the other, but not 
vice versa. An interdependency is a bidirectional relationship between two (or more) 
infrastructures, meaning that the state of each infrastructure influences or is correlated 
to the state of the other(s).   
In general, it seems to be true that “telecommunications and electric power are the 
most critical processes, on which virtually all the others depend”56. However, it is also 
a common feature of all critical infrastructures that they are connected to other 
infrastructures at several different points, forming a complex and dynamic system. 
Thus, an impact on one infrastructure may very well affect other infrastructures 
variously, either through a dependency or interdependency of the systems. The 
possibility of these dependencies and interdependencies undermine critical 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 Joseph Fiksel, ’Designing Resilient, Sustainable Systems,’ Environmental Science and Technology 2003, 37, pp. 
5330-5339, here 5332. 
55 E.g. Dorothy A. Reed, Kailash C. Kapur, and Richard D. Christie, ‘Methodology for Assessing the Resilience of 
Networked Infrastructure’, IEEE Systems Journal, Vol. 3, No. 2, June 2009, pp. 174-180. 
56 Stephen J. Lukasik, Seymor E. Goodman and David W. Longhurst, Protecting Critical Infrastructure Against 
Cyber-Attack, Adelphi Paper 359, New York: Oxford University Press., p.7. 
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infrastructure resilience, because through cascading effects, one (sub) system’s damage 
or lost capacity may affect another system, and this in turn can cycle back to the 
original system or cascade further to other (sub) systems. 
The benefit of resilient design of an individual system is then potentially lost, or as 
Egan in his 2007 analysis notes: “When critical systems are rafted together, the critical 
elements of each become critical elements of all because of the possibility that failure 
in one part of one system will be externalized to others.”57 However, it is also 
understood that while harmful dependencies and interdependencies should be avoided 
(even if they are sometimes extremely difficult to identify before a real failure), they 
cannot be completely avoided; indeed dependent and interdependent critical 
infrastructure systems are increasing due to new technological solutions (e.g. internet-
based industrial control systems and smart grids). 
How to deal with these accumulating risks is not an easy task. Although one might 
think that at least single dependencies are easy to analyse and work around, this need 
not be the case. Some dependencies may be very difficult to discover, as this example 
illustrates: 
 
“A fire at a Sumitomo Chemical Co. factory in Japan in 1993 led to an acute 
worldwide shortage of computer chips for months afterwards. The factory did not 
make computers or computer chips, but provided some 60 per cent of the world 
supply of high-grade epoxy resin required to bond the plastic packages that hold 
integrated circuits.”58 
 
When dealing with interdependencies, things become even more complicated; circular 
snowball-effects may rapidly make a bad situation worse. For example, the electric 
power system requires telecommunications in order to function properly (supervision 
and data acquisition as well as communication between control centres and 
maintenance personnel). However, the telecommunication system also requires electric 
power in order to operate. Consequently, if the power system fails, the communication 
system will eventually fail, making it extremely difficult to get the power system back 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 Mathew Jude Egan, ‘Anticipating Future Vulnerability: Defining Characteristics of Increasingly Critical 
Infrastructure-like Systems’, Contingencies and Crisis Management, Volume 15 Number 1, March 2007, 
pp. 4-17, p. 7; cf. Av. Gheorge, M. Masera. M. Weijnen and L. de Vries, Critical Infrastructures at Risk. Securing the 
European Electric Power System, Netherlands: Springer.), p. 23 ff.. 
58  ‘Critical Thinking: Moving from Infrastructure Protection to Infrastructure Resilience,’ CIIP Resilience Series 
Monograph. CIP Program Discussion Paper series. Virginia: George Mason University. No page numbers. 
 24	  
	  
on line again, which in turn makes it impossible to get the communication system back 
on line, and so on.  
While there are several ways to define and categorise interdependencies,59 let us 
here follow Rinaldi et al. and note there are in general four classes of interdependencies 
between or among infrastructures:60 
 
• Physical Interdependency: Two infrastructures are physically interdependent, if 
the state of each depends upon the material products or services of the other. For 
example, a rail network and a coal-fired electrical generation plant are physically 
interdependent, given that each supplies commodities that the other requires to 
function properly. 
 
• Cyber Interdependency: An infrastructure is cyber interdependent if its state 
depends on information transmitted through the information infrastructure. Cyber 
dependencies include the reliance of telecommunications for supervisory control 
and data acquisition (SCADA) systems, and information technology for e-
commerce and business systems. 
 
• Geographic Interdependency: Infrastructures are geographically interdependent 
if a local environmental event would create changes of state in all of them. 
Geographic dependencies include common corridors that natural gas pipelines 
share with electric power lines and/or telecommunications lines. 
 
• Logical Interdependency: Two infrastructures are logically interdependent if the 
state of each depends upon the state of the other. An example of a logical 
dependency is the impact that oil futures have on natural gas prices and ultimately 
the natural gas infrastructure via changes in infrastructure investment. 
 
As shown by the examples, interdependencies increase the risk of failures or 
disruptions in the affected infrastructures. Again, according to Rinaldi et al., there are 
three major classes of failures:61 
 
• Cascading Failure: A disruption in one infrastructure causes failure in a 
component of another infrastructure, causing a disruption in that one as well. This 
in turn may cause a failure in a third infrastructure, and so on. Thus, the failure 
cascades through the infrastructures like a wave, sometimes revealing new 
interdependencies between seemingly independent critical infrastructures. For 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 See a recent review: Ming Ouyang, Min Ouyang, ‘Review on modeling and simulation of interdependent critical 
infrastructure systems,’ Reliability Engineering & System Safety, Volume 121, January 2014, pp. 43-60. To be found 
at: http://ac.els-cdn.com/S0951832013002056/1-s2.0-S0951832013002056-main.pdf?_tid=cd5596fa-7df2-11e3-
bf39-00000aab0f6b&acdnat=1389796933_f19c8243fe1e4aec9c8b96654ff1d07d  
60 Steven Rinaldi, Steven M., James P. Peerboom And Terrence K. Kelly, ‘Identifying, Understanding, and Analyzing 
Critical Infrastructure Interdependencies,’ IEEE Control Systems Magazine. December 2001. 
61 Rinaldi et al 2001, op. cit. 
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example, a failure in the natural gas infrastructure might result in a failure of a 
power generation unit, causing power blackouts. 
 
• Escalating Failure: A disruption in one infrastructure worsens an existing 
independent disruption in a second infrastructure, mainly by affecting the time of 
recovery or restoration. For example, a disruption in a telecommunications 
network may be escalated by a simultaneous disruption in a road transportation 
network, as repair personnel and equipment are delayed. 
 
• Common Cause Failure: Two or more infrastructure networks are disrupted at 
the same time, of some common cause. For example, during a storm, trees may fall 
onto phone and power lines, causing disruptions to telecommunications and power 
distribution. 
 
Of these, it is basically the first category, cascading failures62 that are the most 
interesting from the point of view of technological security solutions. Take, for 
instance, the ICS/SCADA systems. The current tests are conducted on several levels, 
usually including at least the component, subsystem and whole system levels. However, 
what cannot be tested easily, and what is not usually tested at all, at least in Europe, are 
the system-of-systems level, including interoperability with other systems and possible 
failure propagation and cascading effects due to unpredicted or complex 
interdependencies (e.g. physical/cyber interdependencies between a gas pipeline, an 
electricity grid and the related SCADA systems).63 
It is difficult to test these dependencies and interdependencies in an operational 
environment. While there are some ICT cyber security test facilities in Europe, they 
cannot be used in their current form to fully test the security of ICS because it is not 
possible to perform actual operational tests with the ICS connected to actual critical 
infrastructures. Unlike in the US, there are no testing facilities in Europe which connect 
ICS to infrastructure, such as an electricity grid.  Therefore, in most cases the only 
feasible methodology to study and test dependencies, interdependencies and cascading 
effects is to focus on modelling and simulations.64 
Van Eeten et al. in turn have collected data reported to the media, and while there 
is some scepticism regarding the completeness of information of such reported 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 In some cases common-cause failures may lead to cascading failures, see Panayiotis Kotzanikolaou, Marianthi 
Theoharidou, and Dimitris Gritzali, Cascading Effects of Common-Cause Failures on Critical Infrastructures, to be 
found at: http://www.cis.aueb.gr/Publications/CIP-13%20Cascading%20effects.pdf  
63 See: Irene Eusgeld, Cen Nan and Sven Dietz,  ‘System-of-systems’’ approach for interdependent critical 
infrastructures’,  Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Volume 96, Issue 6, June 2011, pp. 679–686. 
64 There exist a considerable know-how in this field, for instance at the EC JRC. Furthermore, the FP7 CIPRNet 
project www.ciprnet.eu and its predecessor, the earlier FP7 DIESIS project http://www.diesis-project.eu/ are 
focusing on modelling and simulation of dependencies and interdependencies. See also Ouyang 2014, op. cit. 
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incidents, some interesting findings emerge. The study differentiates the Rinaldi 
categorization of failure. Events are classified as cascade initiating (i.e., an event that 
causes an event in another critical infrastructure), cascade resulting (i.e., an event that 
results from an event in another critical infrastructure), and independent (i.e., an event 
that is neither a cascade initiating nor a cascade resulting event). One of the key 
findings is that cascading dependencies are focused to a limited number of critical 
infrastructure sectors; occur more frequently than expected, and do not often cascade 
deeply. The most commonly reported initiators of cascading effects are the ICT and the 
Energy Sector, which makes sense as these offer prerequisite services to many types of 
critical infrastructure sectors.65 
 
Redundancy	  
‘Redundancy’, ‘interoperability’, ‘adaptive capacity’ and ‘resourcefulness’ are some of 
the concepts used in resilience debates to emphasize the degree that the function of a 
system temporarily disturbed can be replaced by other systems, substituted by other 
solutions, re-routed etc. In terms of technological dimension of this issue, the UK 
government definition of redundancy reveals some of the concepts main characteristics 
and possible solutions to enhance it: 
 
“The availability of backup installations or spare capacity will enable operations to 
be switched or diverted to alternative parts of the network in the event of 
disruptions to ensure continuity of services. In some of the sectors of national 
infrastructure, redundancy strategies would lead to an initial loss of performance 
until the alternative infrastructure can be brought into operation. The 
telecommunications sector employs a redundancy strategy to provide the capacity 
and flexibility to meet peak demand for services and enable re-routing of 
communications ‘traffic’ in the event of failure or loss of components. In this 
sector, the switch over to maintain services is instantaneous. The resilience of 
networks reduces when running at or near capacity, although in some sectors or 
organisations it is recognised that it may not always be feasible to operate with 
significant spare capacity within the network.”66 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 M. Van Eeten, A. Nieuwenhuijs, E. Luiijf, M. Klaver and E. Cruz, ‘The State and the Threat of Cascading Failure 
across Critical Infrastructures: The Implications of Empirical Evidence from Media Incident Reports,’ Public 
Administration, vol. 89 (2), pp. 381–400, 2011. 
	  
66 See Section A: Introduction, Definitions and Principles of Infrastructure Resilience, UK Cabinet Office, to be found 
at: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/78902/section-a-natural-hazards-
infrastructure.pdf, item 2.14.  
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Redundancy is thus a factor that should be built in to a critical system if it is 
supposed to be a resilient one (see above resilient design). Basically it means the 
duplication or triplication of critical elements of a system with a backup, and therefore 
an individual component or function failure would not be enough to put the system 
down. 
Creating redundancy is also sometimes understood the ‘other way round’, things 
that should be avoided in a system. It has been noted that single point vulnerabilities are 
quite common in critical infrastructures, and they are obviously to be avoided. 
Similarly, while critical systems should have some kind of backup capability for their 
function or service, “the backup systems or components of the backup systems are most 
often collocated with the primary systems’, or in many cases, “redundant systems feed 
into a single critical node shared by the primary systems.” Therefore, for instance, a 
single electrical distribution panel should not control the flow of commercial power, 
diesel backup generators, and uninterruptible power supply batteries, or a single 
manhole should not house all communications lines leading to and from the facility.67 
How then to measure or test redundancy? While especially in mainstream software 
testing redundancy is usually included, and therefore methodologies and methods have 
been developed, a basic rule would be to create test situations, where one can evaluate 
the excess capacity to reduce the impact of component or subsystem failures; this is 
usually called passive redundancy. Active redundancy testing would then focus, for 
instance, on testing the situation, where monitors detect overload in one power line and 
circuit breakers should automatically disconnect this line and redistribute the power 
across the remaining lines.68 
  
Restoring	  capability	  
‘Restoring capability’ is basically the same concept as ‘recovery’ or ‘rapidity’ used in 
many occasions. In a way, the question is not about a separate functionality from those 
discussed above, as all of the above issues are interrelated to the recovery phase. It has 
been noted that in the Information & Communication Technology (ICT) sector, for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 George H. Baker, A Vulnerability Assessment Methodology for Critical Infrastructure Facilities, 
http://www.jmu.edu/iiia/wm_library/Vulnerability_Facility_Assessment_05-07.pdf 
68 For an application of active redundancy, see https://oce.jpl.nasa.gov/practices/1216.pdf  
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instance, establishing “redundant servers for all critical data and providing an alternate 
way to access that data are essential components of an organization's disaster recovery 
planning” and that having “these redundant services in place at a secure, offsite location 
can bring disaster recovery time down to minutes rather than days.”69  
However, most of the recovery guidelines and related literature is rather focusing 
on community or organisational resilience than on technological dimension of this 
issue, emphasising the importance of such tasks as preparedness, communication and 
coordination between the public sector (government and regional administration), 
private sector and the population at large.70 There exist however some efforts to deal 
also with the technological issues, most notably in such fields as ICT and power grids.  
How then to measure restoring capability? From a more general point of view, 
Moteff has differentiated between two ways to measure resilience that could provide a 
basis to develop more operationalized test schemes for critical infrastructure systems. 
One measure would be the amount of time (or money/losses) it takes for an 
infrastructure or a function to recover fully to normal operations; naturally, the quicker 
the recovery, the more resilient the system. Another way would be to measure the 
performance, that is, whether the system was put out of operation completely or not. 
Consequently, reducing the cases of total loss of performance then would increase 
resilience. Francis and Bekera have developed a mathematical approach for the metrics 
of resilience, which, in short, is a function of system functionality or performance level 
and time. They then have applied this model to an imagined electric power network in 
“Micropolis” with three different options for how to design the network, when the 
threat is the existence of hurricanes.  With their model they then demonstrate – as could 
be predicted – that decision makers should consider undergrounding the power 
networks to a certain extent.71 Gaynor, in turn, sees resilience as a function of 
criticality, time and adaptive capacities, focusing especially on the ‘entity’s’ (client’s) 
willingness to be without the services of the infrastructure.72 To sum up, developing 
relevant standards in this field and developing the testing methods against these 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 Paul Chisholm, Ten Tips for Successful IT Disaster Recovery Planning, to be found at 
http://www.infosectoday.com/Articles/DRPlanning.htm  
70 Cf. National Infrastructure Advisory Council. Critical Infrastructure Resilience. Final Report and Recommendations, 
September 8, 2009. To be found at: http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/niac/niac_critical_infrastructure_resilience.pdf. 
71 Francis and Bekera, op. cit. 
72 Gaynor, op. cit., p. 10. 
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standards would go hand in hand in proceeding towards enhancing restoring capability 
of critical infrastructure. 
 
4. Conclusion:	  way	  forward	  
 
This paper has discussed the concept of resilience in the context of critical 
infrastructure, aiming at operationalizing the concept in such a way that we could better 
understand how resilience of a critical infrastructure could be enhanced, measured and 
tested.  To this effect, first, the paper differentiated between four sectoral dimensions of 
critical infrastructure resilience, namely societal, economic, organisational and 
technological dimensions. Second, focusing on the technological dimension in 
particular, the paper proposed four functional issues to be looked at in more detail: 
resilient design, dependencies and interdependencies, redundancy, and restoring 
capability. This discussion is summarized in Table 1.  
 
Table 1: Technological resilience 
 
What could be tested? How should it be tested? 
Resilient design  
(cf. resilient engineering, reliability, 
robustness, resistance, absorptive 
capacity) 
E.g. tests of the resiliency of a component or a 
system based on real failure data  
Dependencies and 
interdependencies  
E.g. computer-based modelling and simulation of 
dependencies and interdependencies  
Redundancy  
(cf. interoperability, adaptive 
capacity, resourcefulness) 
E.g. passive and active redundancy testing 
Restoring capability  
(cf. recovery,  rapidity) 
E.g. calculating the amount of time/money/losses the 
recovery takes; or measuring the ratio of the lost 
performance/total performance  
  
While this paper has tentatively illustrated one way to operationalise the concept 
of technological resilience, much more conceptual and practical work is needed. 
Preferably, this could be done in working groups organised either sectorally, or in 
cross-sectoral fashion so that the dependencies and interdependencies could be 
considered. European Reference Network for Critical Infrastructure Protection 
(ERNCIP), bringing together experimental facilities and laboratories, critical 
infrastructure operators, security industry, Member States and different European 
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Union bodies would be an ideal coordinator of this work, which strategic goal would be 
to create a more harmonised or standardised understanding of the concept of resilience 
in order critical infrastructure resilience to be better enhanced, evaluated, measured and 
tested. 
The deliverables could include a set of technological resilience indicators and, if 
possible, later an overall index (cf. economic resilience).  Furthermore, this conceptual 
work could be accompanied with developing or benchmarking specific testing 
methodologies and tools to measure and test technological resilience, at least in some 
sectors or individual critical infrastructure –related functions.  The experience of the 
United States, where already some technological resilience tools have been applied, 
should be closely followed. 
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